Prior literature examines the role of inside debt in dampening CEO risk-taking incentives, and several recent studies document a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and firm investment in R&D. A separate line of research suggests that inside debt, by providing greater alignment of CEOs' incentives with debtholders', can reduce the cost of debt financing. We examine whether and under what conditions the alignment-with-debtholders role of inside debt can lead to increased investment levels. In contrast to the simple negative relationship documented in prior research, we hypothesize and find that the relationship between inside debt and both R&D and Capital Expenditure investment levels depends on whether firms require external (debt) financing to fund investments. In particular, we find that the observed negative relation between inside debt and risky investment (R&D) is reduced or reversed for firms facing cash constraints. Similarly, the positive relation between inside debt and safe investment (CapEx) is increased for firms facing cash constraint. Our findings contribute to the literature on CEO incentives and corporate investment policy, and provide a richer understanding of the role of debt-like compensation in reducing agency costs.
Introduction
Over the past several decades, a large literature has explored how corporate investment decisions are influenced by top-management incentives. The early literature documented a positive relation between investment and equity-based (as opposed to cash-based) compensation, concluding that equity-based compensation mitigates short-term investment horizons by better aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. In addition, researchers have argued (and sometimes found) that asymmetric payoffs from stock options (and equity claims in levered firms) promote risk taking, including investment in relatively risky projects.
1 More recently, researchers have explored the relation between investment activity and "inside debt," defined as unsecured long-term fixed claims (primarily definedbenefit pensions and deferred compensation) held by managers. 2 In contrast to equity-based incentives, which are characterized by large upside potential with limited downside losses, the value of inside debt is particularly sensitive to downside risk and helps align the interest of managers and debtholders, who will typically prefer less risky investments relative to those preferred by shareholders. Indeed, inside debt has been proposed as a key control mechanism for reducing managers' overall risk-taking incentives.
Several recent studies have documented a negative association between management inside debt holdings and firm investment in research and development (R&D). We argue, however, that while inside debt can dampen managerial risk-taking incentives, the overall effect of inside debt on the level of investment activity is unclear. First, managers with increased inside debt might substitute riskier investments with safer investments, without reducing the overall level of investment. Second, inside debt aligns the interests of managers with those of debtholders, reducing agency costs that arise due to the conflicts of interest 1 See, for sample, DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn 1990; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987; Coles et al., 2006; Gormley et al., 2013 LEE, MURPHY, OH, AND VANCE: INSIDE DEBT AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT between shareholders and debtholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Therefore, to the extent that lenders take inside debt into account when structuring debt-contracting terms (e.g., Anantharaman et al., 2014) , inside debt will reduce the cost of debt financing which in turn will increase the level of investments for firms that rely on external debt to fund investments.
In this paper, we explore the relation between inside debt and corporate investment, taking into account the effect of inside debt on both the demand side (i.e., inside debt reduces the managerial demand for risky investments but potentially increases the demand for safer investments) and the supply side (i.e., inside debt reduces the cost of external debt financing).
We use R&D and capital expenditures (CapEx) as proxies for risky and safe investment activity, respectively. We exploit the fact that the "supply side" is only relevant for firms that require external debt financing to fund investments, and hypothesize that the relationship between inside debt and investment levels depends on the degree of cash (or liquidity) constraints facing the firm. In particular, for firms with sufficient internal funds to finance investments (i.e., low cash constraints), we predict a negative relation between inside debt and R&D (i.e., risky investment), and a (weakly) positive relation between inside debt and CapEx (i.e., safe investment). However, we expect the negative relation between inside debt and R&D to be reduced or reversed for firms requiring external funding, and also expect the (weakly) positive relation between inside debt and CapEx to be increased for firms with high cash constraints.
Our empirical results largely support our hypotheses. We find the expected negative association between inside debt and R&D spending when cash constraints are low, but find that this relation is reduced or reversed for firms with high cash constraints. Similarly, we show that the association between inside debt and CapEx spending is insignificant (or weakly negative) for firms with low cash constraints, but positive for firms with high cash constraints. Moreover, we find that the positive association between inside debt and investment for cash-constrained firms is strongest for firms with a greater risk of default (based on Altman's Z-scores) where shareholder-debtholder conflicts are expected to be particularly high. Our findings are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including LEE, MURPHY, OH, AND VANCE: INSIDE DEBT AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT alternative measures of cash constraints as proxies for reliance on external funding: low cash holdings, high leverage, and high Hoberg-Maksimovic (2015) Debt-Delay Scores. 3 .
In supplemental tests, we directly assess the relationship between inside debt and changes in debt financing. For cash-constrained firms, we find a significant positive association between inside debt and changes in levels of debt financing. However, we do not find a significant association for unconstrained firms. In addition, we re-examine Wei and Yermack's (2011) finding that equity prices fell when high levels of inside debt were first disclosed following a 2006 SEC disclosure reform. In particular, we show that the stockprice reaction to high disclosed levels of inside debt are negative for firms facing few cash constraints, but positive for firms facing high cash constraints.
This study contributes to the literature examining the relation between management incentives and corporate investment decisions, and also contributes to the literature focusing on underinvestment in cash-constrained firms (Stein, 2003; Franzoni, 2009 ). In particular, lenders protect themselves from shareholder-debtholder conflicts by charging higher interest rates, by imposing restrictive covenants or collateral requirements, and through costly monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . These "protections" increase the cost of capital for firms requiring external debt financing, leading to underinvestment relative to the level that would maximize firm value in the absence of agency costs. Our results suggest that inside debt, by providing greater alignment of management incentives with those of debtholders, can reduce the cost of debt financing for firms facing cash constraints and therefore increase investment levels in such firms, mitigating the underinvestment problem.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 develops our central hypotheses and provides a literature review. Section 3 discusses our research design, and Section 4 describes our data and presents our primary findings. Section 5 describes our supplemental analyses, and Section 6 concludes.
3
Our concept of "cash constraints" is related to, but distinct from, the more-familiar concept of "financial constraints." In particular, while financially constrained firms are typically those with limited access of to external capital markets, our cash-constrained firms are precisely those requiring external capital to fund investments.
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Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
There is a conflict of interest between a firm's "residual claimants" (e.g., owners of common equity) and "fixed claimants" (e.g., owners of unsecured debt) over the level of acceptable risk associated with firm investment. In particular, since shareholders in a levered firm receive a disproportionately large share of the positive cash flows associated with successful risky investments, but bear a disproportionately smaller share of failures (since shareholder losses are limited by the value of their equity), shareholders will typically prefer riskier investments relative to those preferred by fixed claimants. CEOs with wealth tied primarily to equity prices (through, for example, stock ownership, stock options, restricted shares, or other equity-based compensation) have incentives to pursue investments that have positive NPV from the standpoint of shareholders, regardless of whether those projects are valuable for fixed claimants or, indeed, the firm as a whole.
4 Excessive risk-taking (from the perspective of debtholders) after initiating debt financing is commonly referred to as "asset substitution" or "risk-shifting." Fixed claimants, of course, understand these incentives and will protect themselves by charging higher interest rates, by imposing restrictive covenants or collateral requirements, and through costly monitoring. Jensen and Meckling (1976) termed the costs arising from the conflict of interest between residual and fixed claimants the "Agency Cost of Debt," and defined these costs as including not only the loss from suboptimal (risky) investments, but also the costs of monitoring and writing and enforcing debt covenants, and the opportunity cost of forgone investments that would increase the value of the firm as a whole but are either precluded by the covenants or are unprofitable to shareholders when evaluated at the inflated cost of capital charged by appropriately suspicious fixed claimants. Jensen and Meckling (1976) conjecture that the agency cost of debt can be mitigated by contractually obligating the CEO to hold equity and debt securities in proportion to the residual and fixed claims held by outside investors. They note that requirements for CEOs to hold firm debt are not commonly observed in practice, and subsequent research attempts to explain why CEOs' wealth is tied to the value of equity and not to the value of the firm as a 4 Several studies document an association between managerial equity incentives and risk taking (e.g., Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006) .
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whole (e.g., Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992; John and John, 1993) . However, more recent research demonstrates that pensions and deferred compensation represent a substantial component of executives' firm-related wealth, 5 and argues these forms of compensation are debt-like because the manager receives a fixed unsecured claim with value that, in the event of bankruptcy, depends on the liquidating value of the firm (e.g., Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Wei and Yermack, 2011) .
Following the intuition from Jensen and Meckling (1976) , several recent papers document empirical support for the role of debt-like compensation, termed "inside debt," in aligning managers' risk-taking preferences with debt holders compared to equity holders. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find that the ratio of inside debt to inside equity (i.e., the value of managers' stock and option holdings) is negatively associated with default risk, which they interpret as evidence for inside debt motivating managers to reduce firm risk, e.g., by accepting fewer risky investments. Similarly, Cassell et al. (2012) find a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and the volatility of future firm stock returns.
More directly, they also show that inside debt is associated with lower R&D expenditures along with other proxies for firm risk taking. Choy et al. (2014) find firm risk generally, and R&D spending in particular, increases when executive switch from defined-benefit to defined-contribution pension plans (with the benefits under the existing defined-benefit plan "frozen" as of the date of the switch). Wei and Yermack (2011) examine equity and debt prices immediately following initial disclosures of CEO inside debt holdings, and find that when inside debt is large, equity prices fall and debt prices rise. These results are consistent with capital markets adjusting prices to reflect CEOs' incentives being relatively more aligned with debt holders than equity holders. However, they observe that "The net effect appears to destroy enterprise value for these firms overall, as the gains to bondholders appear to be more than offset by losses to stockholders (p. 3839)." Collectively, these studies provide evidence suggesting that the effect of CEO debt compensation is to reduce firm risk taking, and reduce investment in R&D in particular. Inside debt can mitigate the agency cost of debt and therefore may improve a firm's ability to obtain debt financing to pursue positive NPV projects. As the ratio of inside debt to inside equity increases, the CEO's incentives are increasingly aligned with those of the outside debtholders. Lenders, in turn, offer more favorable debt contracting terms for firms that use inside debt to compensate their chief executives, including lower interest rates (Anantharaman et al., 2014) , reduced use of covenants (Chava et al., 2010; Anantharaman et al., 2014) , and lower collateral requirements (Wang et al., 2011) . To the extent inside debt reduces the perceived cost of debt financing (e.g., from lower interest rates and fewer costly covenants), inside debt can increase investment for firms that depend on debt financing to fund investments.
Prior research has generally assumed that firm investment in risky projects will be negatively related to inside debt, because inside debt reduces the CEO's benefit from risktaking activities. We argue that, since inside debt reduces the cost of external debt financing, the relation between inside debt and investment depends on whether firms have sufficient cash holdings or cash flows to fund promising investments. In particular, for firms with 6 See Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003) sufficient capital to finance all projects using internal funds, the relation between inside debt and investment will be unambiguously negative since the reduction in the cost of external debt financing associated with inside debt is irrelevant. But, for cash-constrained firms requiring external financing, inside debt lowers the cost of external debt capital, which, ceteris paribus, increases the equilibrium level of investment.
Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize that the relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and investment levels depends on cash constraints. Following the conventional wisdom, inside debt reduces CEO's incentives to take risks, and therefore we expect that in the absence of cash constraints inside debt will be negatively associated with risky investment levels. However, when firms are cash constrained, inside debt reduces the cost of external debt financing which, in turn, will increase investment levels. Thus, the overall effect of inside debt for cash-constrained firms can be either positive or negative, depending on whether the offsetting effects of reducing risk-taking incentives or increasing ability to borrow funds prevails.
Research Design
To test the relation between inside debt and the level of investment conditional on cash constraints, we regress investment on prior-year values for CEO debt-like incentives, cash constraints facing the firm, and an interaction between the two. Specifically, our primary model is the following:
where Investment is either research and development ("R&D") expense or capital expenditures ("CapEx") depending on the test, Inside Debt Ratio is our measure of CEO debt-based incentives, Constrained is a proxy for cash constraints, α i represents firm fixed effects (to control for firm-specific time-invariant omitted factors affecting investment) and  t represents year fixed-effects, and Control represents a vector of firm-and-year variant control 2009), we scale R&D by lagged total assets and CapEx by lagged property, plant, and equipment ("PP&E").
As discussed above, management incentives to adopt investment policies that favor debt holders over equity holders increase with the portion of debt-like claims in the CEO's overall firm-related wealth portfolio. We operationalize CEO debt incentives using the amount of inside debt divided by CEO's firm-related wealth as follows:
where inside debt is the sum of the actuarial present value of accumulated benefits under defined-benefit pension plans and the total balance in the deferred compensation plans at fiscal year-end (Wei and Yermack, 2011; Cassell et al., 2012; He, 2015) . Inside equity is defined as the sum of stock holdings (obtained by multiplying the number of shares, including restricted shares, by the stock price) and the year-end fair value of stock options based on the Black-Scholes formula. 8 Inside Debt Ratio, which ranges from 0 (no inside debt) to 1 (only inside debt), is intended to capture the relative alignment of CEO incentives with outside debt holders compared to equity holders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) observed that CEO incentives to favor one group of financial claimants over others are mitigated by requiring the CEO to hold strips of residual and fixed claims in exact proportion to the firm's capital structure. Based on this observation, many empirical studies of inside debt have measured inside debt as the ratio of the CEO's debt-equity ratio (i.e., inside debt divided by inside equity) to the firm's debt-equity ratio, which measures the alignment between the CEO's risk-shifting incentives and the risk-7 Barton, Brown, and Stulz (2012) , for example, show that stock-price volatility is strongly related to firmlevel investments in R&D. 8 Option values for the portfolio of option held at the end of the fiscal year are computed assuming a risk-free rate equal to yield on 7-year U.S. treasuries, volatilities based on monthly stock returns over the prior 48 months, and dividend yields based on three-year rolling averages. The expected term for options is assumed to be 70% of the full term.
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shifting policy that would optimize the value of the firm as a whole. We depart from this "ratio of ratios" approach for three primary reasons. First, the ratio-of-ratios makes sense only if the firm's fixed claims are composed entirely of unsecured claims with payoff characteristics similar to the CEO's deferred compensation and defined-benefit pension plans (which would be highly unusual).
9 Second, our focus is on whether the CEO's incentives are aligned with debtholders relative to shareholders, and not whether incentives are aligned to the overall capital structure. Third, since we use the firm's debt-equity ratio in constructing our proxy for cash constraints, the ratio-of-ratios would be mechanically related to this proxy.
We construct a measure of cash constraints, Constrained, as a proxy for firms with insufficient internal resources to finance investments. constraints are lowest (β 1 for Constrained=0) from the effect when constraints are highest (β 1 + β 2 ).
We include a number of traditional control variables to account for determinants of firm investment policy that are also likely to be correlated with CEO debt-based compensation. Consistent with prior research on corporate investment levels, we include proxies for firm size, asset growth, and Tobin's Q to control for the investment opportunity set available to the firm. We also control for operating environment volatility and Altman's Z-score as proxies for firm risk. In addition, since shareholder-debtholder conflicts are expected to be more salient in firms with a greater risk of default, we present separate tests for subsamples with high and low Altman Z-scores. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
Primary Results
Data composition and sample description
While theoretical interest in the impact of inside debt on investment decisions is not new (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Sundaram and Yermack, 2007) , changes in disclosure laws in 2006 substantially improved researchers' ability to examine this topic empirically.
Beginning in 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted expanded executive compensation disclosure requirements that require firms to provide detailed information on executive pension benefits, deferred compensation, and year-end option holdings. Information from these augmented disclosures is available in proxy statements (and in Computstat's Execucomp database) for firms with a fiscal year-end following December 15, 2006, which we adopt as the starting period for our sample selection. We combine these data on executive equity and debt-based compensation with financial statement data from
Compustat and stock price data from CRSP to form the primary basis of our sample. 10 We exclude financial firms (SIC codes from 6000-6999) because they do not report research and development expenses. Our full sample is comprised of 1,307 firms and 7,168 firm-year 10 We limit our sample to Execucomp firms, which include firms in the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, the S&P SmallCap 600, and a small number of other firms tracked by Standard and Poors. Table 2 . Consistent with the prior literature, our measure of debt-based incentives, Inside Debt Ratio, is negatively associated with R&D, consistent with the effect of inside debt being to reduce CEO incentives to take risks. Also, we find a negative correlation between Constrained and both measures of investment, consistent with cash constraints reducing firms' ability to pursue investment opportunities. missing R&D data are excluded from the regressions in columns (2) and (4), which accounts for the different sample sizes across our tests.
The relation between inside debt, cash constraints, and investment
12
As shown in column (1) of Table 3 , we find a positive but insignificant association between Inside Debt Ratio and CapEx, while in column (2) we find a significant (at the 5% level) negative association between Inside Debt Ratio and R&D. Since R&D expenditures are presumably more risky than CapEx, these results are consistent with a number of recent papers that document a negative association between inside debt and the riskiness of firm investment policies.
As noted earlier, we expect the relationship between inside debt and firm investment to vary based on the level of cash constraints facing the firm, because the effect of inside debt on the supply of debt financing (i.e., due to its effect of reducing the cost of debt capital) is likely to only apply to firms requiring external financing to fund investments. In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 , we include Constrained as an additional independent variable, as well as an interaction between Inside Debt Ratio and Constrained. Of note, the coefficient on Constrained is significantly negative in both columns (3) and (4), suggesting that our measure of cash constraints does indeed reflect firms' underlying ability to fund investments.
The coefficient on Inside Debt Ratio in columns (3) and (4) -which measures the effect of inside debt on investment for cash un-constrained firms -is negative for both CapEx (in contrast to column (1)) and R&D (consistent with column (2)). Therefore, we conclude that, for cash unconstrained firms, inside debt is associated with reduced investment.
Our primary variable of interest in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 is the interaction term, Inside Debt Ratio  Constrained. We find a significant positive coefficient for the interaction of Inside Debt Ratio and Constrained in the models of both CapEx and R&D, suggesting that investment increases with inside debt in cash-constrained firms (but not in unconstrained firms). In particular, we find that while for unconstrained firms there is a 12 Managers exercise discretion in reporting R&D expense and thus not all firms choose to separately report R&D. Prior studies have commonly replaced missing R&D values with zero (i.e., interpret missing to mean there is no significant R&D activity). Koh and Reeb (2015) examine innovation activities of missing R&D firms, as well as changes in R&D reporting following auditor changes, and conclude that treating missing R&D as zero can lead to substantial bias in tests. Therefore, we do not replace missing R&D with zero, and instead drop firms with missing R&D from our sample. However, we note that our results are not sensitive to replacing missing R&D observations with zero.
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negative association between inside debt and R&D, the incremental effect of cash-constraints on this relationship is positive. Moreover, the overall effect (i.e., the main effect plus the interaction) is significantly positive (at the 10% level). Thus, the evidence in Table 3 suggests that when cash constraints are high (i.e., when the need for outside financing is high), inside debt increases investment. It is particularly notable that we find this positive effect of inside debt on R&D levels given the expected risk-reducing influence of inside debt on CEO risktaking preferences (as suggested in column (2) and in prior literature).
We recognize that CEO compensation and firm investment are endogenously determined, which raises the possibility that omitted variables correlated with both inside debt and investment policy are driving our results. Two elements of our research design mitigate this concern. First, we estimate the relationship between CEOs' inside debt incentives and future firm investment (i.e., Inside Debt Ratio is measured at time t and both R&D and CapEx are measured at time t+1). Since inside debt and firm investment are not measured contemporaneously, there is reduced likelihood that an omitted variable associated with both is causing our results. Second, in all of our regressions we employ firm fixed effects. As such we hold constant any omitted factor that is constant at the firm level across time. Thus, in order for an omitted variable to affect our results, it must be the case that changes in any such variable is associated with time-series variation in both our measures of inside debt and investment, which we view as less likely. Prior studies examining the effects of inside debt have also considered the potential for endogeneity, and have attempted to address this issue using an instrumental variables (IV) approach. In untabulated analyses, we conduct 2SLS using instruments identified in prior studies on inside debt (e.g., Anantharaman et al., 2014; Cassell et al., 2012; He, 2015) , and continue to find significant results consistent with those in Table 3 .
13
13 As noted in these prior studies, identifying appropriate instruments for inside debt is a difficult task, and requires variables that are both correlated with inside debt, and uncorrelated with investment (except through the relationship with inside debt). Based on our own assessment of the likelihood these instruments used in prior literature meet both criteria (the latter of which cannot be directly tested), we have doubts an IV approach can adequately rule out endogeneity, and thus we do not emphasize our IV results.
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Alternative measures of cash constraints
As noted above, we measure cash constraints based on firms' ex-ante cash holdings and leverage (Biddle et al., 2009; Cheng et al, 2013) . While our measure assumes both cash holdings and leverage have an equal effect on firm's ability to finance investments using internal funds, in this section we repeat our analyses after developing measures of cash (or liquidity) constraints based on cash holdings and leverage separately, and also using Hoberg and Maksimovic's (2015) measure of financial constraints for firms requiring external debt financing to fund investments.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 report the results of tests using the scaled decile rank based on (the negative of) cash holdings, and columns (3) and (4) report results based on the scaled decile rank of leverage. While the results using the cash-based measure are very similar to those reported in Table 3 , the results using the leverage-based measure are weaker.
In particular, the interaction between Inside Debt Ratio and Constrained is not significant (though still positive) in the CapEx model in column (3) and the interaction is significant at only the 10% level in the R&D model. While both sets of results are still broadly consistent with our hypothesis that the relationship between inside debt and firm investment depends on the level of financing constraints, columns (1) -(4) of analyses using a scaled decile rank (to be consistent with our Constrained variable) of Hoberg and Maksimovic's (2015) "Debt Focus Delay Investment Score", which measures cash constraints faced by firms with plans to issue debt to finance investment.
Column (5) of Table 4 reports results using this disclosure-based measure of constraints for our model of CapEx, while column (6) reports results for our model of R&D.
We note that in both models, Constrained is significantly (at the 10% level) negatively associated with investment, as expected. However, this association appears to be weaker than for models using our primary measure of constraints, as the magnitude and significance of both coefficients is much smaller than for those reported in Table 3 , reflecting, in part, the reduced sample size with available Hoberg-Maksimovic data. The interaction of Inside Debt Ratio with Constraints is positively associated with CapEx in column (5), although the association is not significant. In column (6), we find a significantly positive association between the interaction and R&D investment, which corroborates our findings in Table 3 using our primary measure of constraints.
Subsample analysis for firms close to financial distress
To this point, we have documented evidence consistent with our hypothesis that the relationship between inside debt and investment levels depends on the cash constraints facing the firm. To the extent that inside debt leads to increased investment for cash-constrained firms by reducing agency costs associated with borrowing, and hence reducing the cost of debt capital, we expect this effect to be particularly strong in settings in which the agency cost of debt is likely to be most severe. In particular, the agency cost of debt (and hence the value of inside debt) is relevant only in settings where managers can consider investment projects with downside risk that exceeds the value of the equity-holders' limited-liabilityprotected claims. Two settings of primary relevance include cases where (a) managers can take very large investment risks, and (b) where even small investment risks can lead to downside losses borne by debtholders.
While there is no obvious way (with available data) to measure the potential downside from large risky investments, we can measure default risks that could be triggered by relatively modest "risky investments." In particular, as firms get nearer to default, the agency conflict between equityholders vs. debtholders becomes more acute because the differential payoffs for positive compared to negative realizations of risky projects for the two groups of claimholders becomes more salient (or conversely, the further a firm is from default, the more closely the payoff function for debtholders and equityholders resemble each other). Table 5 repeats our primary analyses for subsamples based on "nearness" to financial distress, using Altman's Z-scores that measure the probability of bankruptcy within two years. To examine whether the interaction between inside debt and cash constraints is more pronounced for firms that are "closer" to default, we classify firms with a Altman Z-Score below the conventional cut-off of 1.81 as financially distressed (Begley et al. 1996; Blay et al. 2011) , while firms with a Z-score above 3.00 are classified as financially sound (Altman, 2012) . Results from the subsample analyses are presented in Table 5 . The main effect of Inside Debt Ratio (i.e., the effect of inside debt for firms having sufficient cash to fund investments internally) is negative across all models, but particularly so for firms classified as being financially distressed (as shown in Column 3, for financially sound firms, the association between Inside Debt Ratio and CAPEX is insignificant). Thus, it appears that inside debt has an especially pronounced effect on CEOs' incentives to take risks when firms are nearer to default. Similarly, we find that the magnitude of the interaction term is much greater for both the CAPEX and R&D models for the distressed sample than for the sound sample, consistent with inside debt having more scope for reducing the debt cost of capital when agency costs between shareholders and lenders is greater.
Additional Tests
Credit-market accessibility analyses
Inside debt can reduce financing frictions caused by the agency conflict between debt and equity holders, and hence reduce the cost of external debt. Thus, while inside debt may reduce a manager's incentive to take risky investments, our results suggest that the reduced cost of debt for cash-constrained firms (i.e., those requiring external financing) can result in an overall positive effect on investment. In this section we examine the mechanism of debt market access more directly.
Building upon the research design used in prior studies examining debt financing (Bradshaw et al. 2006; Bharath et al. 2008; Balakrishnan et al. 2013) , we examine the effect of inside debt on the propensity to obtain debt financing using the following equation:
where ΔDEBT is net debt financing measured as the cash proceeds from the issuance of longterm debt less cash payments for long-term debt reductions less the net changes in current debt. Consistent with our earlier argument that reducing financing frictions is likely to be particularly helpful for firms with ex-ante cash constraints, we partition our sample based on the median value of our Constrained measure (Balakrishnan et al. 2013 ). We expect β 1 > 0 only for the constrained subsample. Table 6 presents the results for the credit-market accessibility analysis. While the coefficient on Inside Debt Ratio for the financially constrained sample (column (1)) is positive and significant, the coefficient on Inside Debt Ratio for financially unconstrained firms (column (2)) is not significant. This result indicates that the positive effect of inside debt on net debt financing is concentrated among financially constrained firms, i.e., firms for which a reduction in the cost of debt financing is expected to have a greater impact on borrowing. Our results are similar when we divide the sample by top and bottom terciles based on our Constrained measure (columns (3) and (4)). This evidence corroborates the finding in Anantharaman et al. (2014) that inside debt has a favorable effect on debt contracting terms.
Market-reaction analysis
Beginning in 2006, the SEC adopted expanded executive compensation disclosure requirements, including that firms provide detailed information on actuarial values of executive pension benefit plans, market values for deferred compensation, and year-end option holdings. Wei and Yermack (2011) time) large actuarial values of executive pension and deferred compensation. They document that bond prices rise while equity prices fall for firms which disclose that their CEOs have particularly large defined benefit pensions or deferred compensation. 14 This evidence is consistent with equity markets recognizing a loss of value due to CEOs taking actions (e.g., adopting "too safe" investment policies) that favor debtholders over equityholders.
However, if inside debt reduces the agency costs of debt, which are born by shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , there may be potential offsetting benefits of inside debt from equityholders' perspective. In particular, to the extent that agency costs of debt increases the cost of debt and prevents firms from pursuing otherwise attractive investment opportunities, we expect that the negative stock-market reaction to disclosure of inside debt should be less pronounced for firms more likely to underinvest because of the inflated cost of external debt financing. As discussed above, firms that require external financing are more likely to underinvest (Hubbard, 1998; Stein, 2003) . Therefore, we examine whether there is a difference in stock-market reactions for cash-constrained (i.e., firms more likely to require external financing to fund investment opportunities) and cashunconstrained firms. Table 7. CAR is calculated using Fama and French's 4 factor model with a window (0,1) around the proxy filing date. The average CAR for constrained firms (firms with above-median values of Constrained) is positive, while the average CAR for unconstrained firms is negative. The difference between the mean CAR for constrained vs. unconstrained firms is positive and significant at the 1% level. This is true both for firms disclosing any inside debt holdings for their CEOs, as well as firms disclosing above-median values of inside debt holdings
LEE, MURPHY, OH, AND VANCE: INSIDE DEBT AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT
Next, we conduct a multivariate test of the difference in market response to initial disclosures for constrained vs. unconstrained firms using the following model:
For unconstrained firms, we expect a negative or insignificant response to the disclosure of inside debt, as found in Wei and Yermack (2011) (i.e., we expect β 1 < 0). If the market recognizes the ability of inside debt to mitigate underinvestment for cash-constrained firms, then we expect β 2 > 0. Since information about the cash constraints facing firms is less likely to be new to the market, we expect either an insignificant or negative sign for β 3 .
Consistent with the findings in Wei and Yermack (2011) , in Panel B of Table 7 we find a negative response to the disclosure of inside debt for unconstrained firms, although this relationship is insignificant when we include industry fixed effects in the model (Columns (2) and (4)). However, consistent with our expectations, we find a significantly positive interaction across all four specifications, indicating that the negative market reaction to inside debt is mitigated, and even reversed, when the firm faces cash constraints. Thus, an assessment of the market reaction to inside debt supports our argument that inside debt can increase investment by reducing agency costs of debt, but this effect manifests primarily for firms likely to require external financing.
Conclusion
In contrast to prior studies that have predicted a simple negative relationship between inside debt and risky (e.g., R&D) investment, we hypothesize that the relationship between inside debt and investment levels depends on whether firms have sufficient internal cash holdings or cash flows to fund promising investments. For firms with sufficient internal resources to fund investments, we predict and find a negative relation between inside debt and R&D (i.e., risky investment). However, we find that the negative relation between inside debt and R&D is reduced or reversed for firms with high cash constraints (i.e., firms requiring external funding), and we also find the positive relation between inside debt and CapEx is increased for cash-constrained firms. Note: p-values in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significance at a 0.10, a 0.05 and a 0.01 level. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ΔDEBT is net debt financing measured as the cash proceeds from the issuance of long-term debt less cash payments for long-term debt reductions less the net changes in current debt. 
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